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Certification

trust|me can be used to support different certification processes. Some of the provided security features should allow to be used as TSF for Common Criteria certification with trust|me as part of the Target of Evaluation (TOE). As part of the trusted connector trust|me already got the IDS-ready label (Trust Profile) after having its implementation concept evaluated.

Remember that we only describe the features which are supported by the mainline implementation of trust|me (consisting of the container management layer daemon cmld, the smartcard and security helper daemon scd, the trusted platform module 2 helper daemon tmp2d) and the provided yocto based CML distribution, companioned by its reference c0 implementation trustx-coreos.

In a nutshell planned certifications are:

Security Functionality to support Common Criteria Evaluations

The following briefly described security functionality can support Common Criteria Evaluations where the CML including its components cmld, tpm2d, scd as part of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) provides a secure isolation service for containers.

TSF Description Implementation / Components State
CML Audit. Enables monitoring key events that occur in the components of the CML. It provides mechanisms to store and forward audit events occurring in the TOE (cmld itself) and it’s operational environment (OE) namely the Linux kernel. cmld as auditd, kernel audit done
CML Secure Container Init. Ensures code integrity and authenticity for containers and their GuestOSes instantiated by the cmld. UEFI secure boot, kernel module signing, IMA appraise for Linux firmware as trusteded computing base (TCB) for the CML; cmld and scd for containers done
CML Container Isolation. Ensures that no uncontrolled information exchange between containers is possible. Only a write-up according to the Bell-La Padula security model from c0 compartment to service containers is allowed. cmld configures Linux namespaces, cgroups and capabilities done
CML Container Data Storage. Ensures data integrity, authenticity and confidentiality for service containers by utilizing a Secure Element as secure key storage. cmld and scd using libctccid for SmartCardHSM integration, dm-crypt and dm-integrity done
CML System Data Storage. Ensures data confidentiality for CML data partition based on TPM as secure key storage tpm2d and ibmtss for kernel dm-crypt done
CML Device Access Control. Ensure that only configured device access is allowed for a container. If exclusive access is configured, this is to be enforced by this TSF. cmld configures device cgroups and network devices access (netns) done
CML Updates. Ensures that only authentic and integrity protected updates are performed, either to the security supporting parts of the OE – kernel, modules and firmware – as well as the TOE – the CML – and the compartment images and configuration. cmld, scd done

DIN SPEC 27070 - IDS-Specific Requirements

Relevant IDS-specific requirements specified in the DIN SPEC 27070 [DE] [EN] which are fulfilled or supported by the mainline trust|me software stack. Since the IDS Component Certification Catalogue is slightly advanced to the standardized DIN SPEC, we refer to version 2.1.0 of the Component Certification Catalogue.

Criteria/Requirement Implementation and components State
COM 01 - Protected connection c0 gains all physical network interfaces and thus can enforce VPN/IDSCPv2 connections by firewall means done
COM 02 - Mutual authentication Device certificate with TPM-protected private key as client certificate (scd, ibmtss) done
COM 03 - State of the art cryptography kernel, scd (Openssl), and tpm2d use crypto in compliance with BSI TR-02102-1 done
COM 04 - Remote attestation UEFI measured boot, kernel (IMA) for modules and firmware measurements, cmld for container image measurements, tpm2d for server side, rattestation tool for client side partially done
COM 05 - Platform integrity UEFI secure boot, kernel and all CML components as EFI binary, kernel module signing facility, IMA appraise for firmware done
COM 06 - Configuration and app integrity Signed container images and configuration files provided by cmld, scd done
IAM 01 - Connector identifier Device certificate with TPM-protected key (tpm2d, ibmtss) done
IAM 02 - Time Service Container with ntpd, privileged access to system time (CAP_SYS_TIME in host System) partially done
IAM 03 - Online certificate status check Integration of stunnel or IDSCPv2 with OCSP in certificate possible planned
OS 01 - Container support cmld configures Linux namespaces, cgroups and capabilities to span containers done
OS 02 - App separation Service containers for apps, c0 for routing and management done
OS 03 - Service authenticity and integrity Based on code signatures for the allowed containers, the authenticity and integrity of all containers are verified prior to installation and execution. cml provides mechanism to register trusted CA certificates. done
OS 04 - System component authenticity and integrity The authenticity and integrity of all (non-container) system components (kernel, cmld) are verified as part of Secure Boot. done
OS 05 - Container separation The CML is protected from the applications in the containers by Linux kernel security mechanisms (capabilities, cgroups, namespaces) done
OS 06 - Backup encryption The cmld encrypts and signs all data partitions and sends them to a remote backup server planned
APS 01 - App signature Container Images are signed and the cmld verifies those signatures before starting the container done
APS 02 - App signature verification cmld verifies the signatures for all container images before installation (after download) and before each execution of the container. done
APS 04 - Requirements for the runtime environment RAM and CPU resources in container config, cmld sets kernel cgroups accordingly done
APS 05 - App installation Apps are independent trust|me containers. done

IDS / IEC 62443 Requirements

Relevant IDS requirements (DIN SPEC 27070 / IDS Component Certification Catalog Version 2.1.0) which are also part of the IEC 62443-4-2. The CR in the IDS world are equivalent to the IEC 62443-4-2 and derived from the IEC 62443-3-3 SR.

62443-IAC: Identification and Authentication Control

Criteria/Requirement Implementation and components State
CR 1.1 – Human user identification and authentication (c0) Human users only interact with the connector via SSH, or locally via c0. Linux user management in c0, password and ssh-keys during provisioning done
CR 1.1 (1) – Unique identification and authentication (c0) ssh-key and PAM password for local logins done
CR 1.1 (2) - Multifactor authentication for all interfaces (c0) deny local logins and enforce password for ssh keys, (optional) SE with User PIN for containers done
CR 1.2 – Software process and device identification and authentication Device certificate with TPM-protected private key for identification done
CR 1.2 (1) - Unique identification and authentication The CA that issues the certificate ensures that the certified public keys are unique, cmld provides a CSR for the device certificate done
CR 1.3 – Account management Linux user management in c0 done
CR 1.4 – Identifier management Device certificate with device UUID done
CR 1.5 – Authenticator management ssh-keys and user-pin combined with system pin of cmld for managing containers done
CR 1.5 (1) - Hardware security for authenticators Device certificate with TPM-protected private key for identification planned
CR 1.7 – Strength of password-based authentication (c0) only ssh public-key access, local user access PAM or disable completely done
CR 1.8 – Public key infrastructure certificates Device certificate as part of PKI done
CR 1.9 – Strength of public key-based authentication Device certificate validation in rattestation client done
CR 1.9 (1) - Hardware security for public key-based authentication TPM private key for Device certificate done
CR 1.10 – Authenticator feedback A login attempt using SSH with an invalid or not stored private key or the usage of a user PIN is denied with a standard error message which does not provide any insight. done
CR 1.11 – Unsuccessful login attempts (c0) PAM tally2 for local and remote logins planned

62443-UC: Use Control

Criteria/Requirement Implementation and components State
CR 2.1 - Authorization enforcement (c0) Linux user management, SSH login done
CR 2.1 (1) – Authorization enforcement for all users (humans, software processes and devices) (c0) Linux user management done
CR 2.1 (2) - Permission mapping to roles (c0) Linux user management, SSH login done
CR 2.5 – Session lock (c0) The SSH server terminates all remote sessions after a configured time of inactivity as described in CR 2.6. done
CR 2.6 – Remote session termination (c0) The SSH server supports a timeout, the admin can kill any existing SSH session and the user can disconnect actively. done
CR 2.8 – Auditable events See TSF Audit, provided by cmld and kernel audit done
CR 2.9 – Audit storage capacity cmld’s device config provides option for storage capacity done
CR 2.9 (1) - Warn when audit record storage capacity threshold reached cmld generates an audit record done
CR 2.11 – Timestamps cmld uses local synchronized system time for audit records done
CR 2.11 (1) – Time synchronization ntpd in container planned
CR 2.11 (2) – Protection of time source integrity NTPsec in ntp container planned
CR 2.12 – Non-repudiation (c0) pid and uid during login attempt, PAM audit log, kernel audit framework done
CR 2.12 (1) – Non-repudiation for all users c0 and all service containers use PAM module for kernel audit framework planned

62443-SI: System Integrity

Criteria/Requirement Implementation and components State
CR 3.4 – Software and information integrity Secure boot UEFI kernel and CML, Linux IMA appraise for firmware, cmld and tpm2d for GuestOS signatures done
CR 3.4 (1) – Authenticity of software and information Measured boot of all stages (UEFI, IMA, cmld and tpm2d) protected by TPM and rattestation for verification done
CR 3.4 (1) – Authenticity of software and information Measured boot with DRTM (Intel-TXT, tboot) planned
CR 3.4 (2) – Automated notification of integrity violations Recovery system for audit log planned
CR 3.8 – Session integrity (c0) ssh server done
CR 3.9 – Protection of audit information use signed audit records with device key protected by TPM planned

62443-DC: Data Confidentiality

Criteria/Requirement Implementation and components State
CR 4.1 - Information confidentiality data at rest protection see TSF CML Container Data Storage and TSF CML System Data Storage done
CR 4.2 - Information persistence Reset TPM FDE key for whole system (tpm2d), delete wrapped container keys (cmld) done
CR 4.2 (1) - Erase of shared memory resources Linux kernel memory subsystem done
CR 4.2 (2) - Erase verification cmld responds to container wipe done
CR 4.3 - Use of cryptography BSI TR-02102-1 compliant crypto done

62443-RDF: Restricted Data Flow

Criteria/Requirement Implementation and components State
CR 5.1 – Network segmentation Linux network namespaces, c0 as router done

62443-TRE: Timely Response to Events

Criteria/Requirement Implementation and components State
CR 6.1 – Audit log accessibility access to audit log through cmld in c0 done
CR 6.2 – Continuous monitoring audit log forwarder to backend planned

62443-RA: Resource Availability

Criteria/Requirement Implementation and components State
CR 7.1 – Denial of service protection Linux cgroups for CPU and RAM usage done
CR 7.2 – Resource management cmld to configure CPU and RAM limits done
CR 7.3 – Control system backup cmld to backup its configuration and logs planned
CR 7.3 (1) - Backup integrity verification Device private key signature on backup file planned
CR 7.4 – Control system recovery and reconstitution Use backup of CR 7.3 planned
CR 7.6 – Network and security configuration settings (c0) container backup planned
CR 7.6 (1) – Machine-readable reporting of current security settings cmld provides container and GuestOS configuration as protobuf, iptables/nftables tool in (c0) done
CR 7.7 – Least functionality only necessary device and network interfaces are allowed per default for containers done

62443-NDR: Network Device Requirements

Criteria/Requirement Implementation and components State
NDR 1.13 - Access via untrusted networks nftables/iptabels in c0 done
NDR 2.4 – Mobile code Mobile code in form of service containers done
NDR 2.4 (1) - Mobile code authenticity check container integrity and authenticity through cmld done
NDR 3.2 – Malicious code protection only signed and validated containers are executed by cmld done
NDR 3.10 – Support for updates cmld provides mechanism to update CML, kernel and GuestOSes as well as container configuration done
NDR 3.10 (1) – Update authenticity and integrity only signed and validated updates for containers and CML are performed by cmld (see TSF CML Updates) done
NDR 3.12 – Provisioning product supplier roots of trust TPM and UEFI keys need to be provisioned in life cycle done
NDR 3.13 – Provisioning asset owner roots of trust cmld provides trusted CA store for additional owner CAs done
NDR 3.14 – Integrity of the boot process UEFI Secure Boot done
NDR 5.2 – Zone boundary protection network namespaces for service containers done
NDR 5.2 (1) Deny all, permit by exception nftables/iptables in c0 and service containers done
NDR 5.2 (2) Island mode nftables/iptables done
NDR 5.2 (3) Fail close nftables/iptables done